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FINANCIAL VULNERABILITY AND INCOME INEQUALITY: 
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Nicholas Apergis1 
This study explores, for the first time, how financial vulnerability affects income 
inequality across OECD countries, from 1990 to 2015. The empirics use a new financial 
vulnerability index constructed by Adrian and Duarte (2016). Through the methodology 
of their modeling approach, panel GARCH and GMM methods, the findings indicate 
that financial vulnerability exerts a negative impact on income equality conditions. 
The results survive certain definitions of income inequality and corruption, while 
they highlight the importance of financial stability conditions, with potential further 
repercussions to the real economy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The role of financial vulnerability is relevant to GDP growth, associated with risks 
to asset valuations (Adrian et al., 2015). This vulnerability includes the vulnerability 
of financial institutions. The financial system, especially after the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC), has become increasingly fragile (Liu, 2012; Tropeano, 
2013). Based on the financial fragility hypothesis, Minsky (1982) argues that the 
intrinsic characteristics of banking institutions make firms to face bankruptcy, 
with a negative effect on the real economy. 
Furthermore, given the wide differences of income and wealth across the 
globe, as well as the role of the banking sector to provide access to credit (Jalilian 
and Kirkpatrick, 2002; Kai and Hamori, 2009), it is imperative to explore the 
relationship between financial vulnerability and income inequality. Beck et al. 
(2004) point out that income inequality and restricted access to finance can lead to 
reduced growth and welfare levels, while Mallick and Sousa (2013) investigate the 
impact of financial stress across Eurozone countries. 
Financial vulnerability can be described either as banking failures and frictions, 
high asset price volatility, or a shortage of market liquidity. Financial vulnerability 
could also disrupt a country’s payment system and, thus, to destabilize the 
entire economy. In other words, financial vulnerability can cause significant 
macroeconomic cost effects, including a deteriorating income distribution. Thus, 
mitigating financial vulnerabilities is essential for the macroeconomy, since these 
vulnerabilities cause changes in households and corporate sector’s balance sheets, 
having potential impacts on the distribution of financial risk in the real economy.
Based on the above discussion, this paper investigates, to the best of our 
knowledge for the first time, how financial vulnerability affects income inequality 
across OECD countries, from 1990 to 2015. The analysis makes use of the financial 
vulnerability index constructed by Adrian and Duarte (2016). More specifically, 
they construct financial vulnerability from the National Financial Conditions 
Index (NFCI), provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, which considers 
105 financial, money, credit supply, and shadow bank indicators. 
The paper is close to the strand of the literature that considers the role of the 
term spread in affecting the real economy. Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) and 
Estrella and Mishkin (1998) show that term spreads forecast business cycles, while 
Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012), Lopez-Salido et al. (2017), and Krishnamurthy and 
Muir (2016) document that they forecast risks associated with GDP growth. Adrian 
et al. (2016) also provide evidence that stressful financial conditions increase 
GDP volatility. Philippon (2009), Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012), Krishnamurthy 
and Muir (2016), and Lopez-Salido et al. (2017) document that tighter financial 
conditions contribute to the contraction in output. Finally, the analysis considers 
the literature of the role of financial vulnerability in the entire economy, especially, 
after the 2008 financial crisis. This literature highlights that financial vulnerability 
indicates the presence of amplification mechanisms in relevance to leverage and 
asset valuations (Adrian et al., 2015; Aikman et al., 2015).
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II. DATA AND METHODOLOGICAL MEASURES
Annual data from 1990-2015 are considered, for a balanced panel of 35 OECD 
countries are used (Appendix A shows the countries included). The dependent 
variable is measured as income distribution, proxied by the Gini coefficient (GINI), 
which ranges from 0 (perfect income equality) to 1 (perfect income inequality). 
Data are sourced from the World Bank database. The control variable in focus 
is the index of financial vulnerability (FV) (Adrian and Duarte, 2016). This work 
provides the estimation of this index across OECD countries as a single panel. 
However, their index is available only for the U.S. In that sense, we make use 
of the same methodology and build a similar index for other OECD countries 
as well. Adrian et al. (2016) support the presence of downside risks for the GDP 
distribution affected by the course of financial conditions. The methodological 
extraction of the index is shown in Appendix B.
For the calculation of the financial vulnerability index, except the financial 
conditions measured above, we also obtain data on inflation, measured by the 
Consumer Price Index (for the euro countries, after 2000, prices are measured 
by the Harmonized Price index), income, proxied by real GDP (at constant 2010 
prices), and central bank interest rates are proxied by the 3-month market rates. 
The analysis also uses the equity risk premium (ERP), measured as the excess 
return investors require to invest in stocks (Duarte and Rosa, 2014). It is based on a 
monthly basis. The analysis employs Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) 
indexes for equity markets. All returns are on a monthly basis (expressed in US 
dollars). Risk free rates are 3-month bond yields from the International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) database. The vulnerability index is on a 10-point scale (0= total 
financial security, and 10= total financial vulnerability).
The remaining independent variables are: i) income per capita (PCI), ii) the 
enrolment ratio (ENROLL), concerning secondary level o education (% gross), iii) 
the Polity index (POL) from the Polity IV database (Marshall and Jaggers, 2015); 
it illustrates the quality of institutions (Rodrik, 1996). The index is determined is 
ranging from -10 (pure autocracies) to 10 (pure democracies), iv) corruption (COR) 
which can adversely affect the economy (Mauro, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; 
among others). The ICRG corruption index is used, taking extreme values as 0=total 
corruption and 6=absence of corruption; it has been reversed so that 0=absence of 
corruption and 6=total corruption, v) population (POP) that accounts for the size 
of the country (Neumayer, 2003a,b); the larger the population of a country, the 
greater might be the need for financial access that will eventually affect income 
distribution, and finally, vi) government expenses (GOV), measured as percentages 
of GDP. The variables of population, school enrolment and government expenses 
as percentage of GDP are taken from the World Bank database. 
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A. Panel Unit Roots
First, we examine the unit root properties. Two second-generation panel unit root 
tests are employed; the Pesaran (2007) test, where the null hypothesis is a unit root 
and that by Smith et al. (2004), where all tests investigate the presence of a unit 
root. The results in Table 1 support the presence of a unit root across all variables; 
the exception is the variables of the Gini coefficient and the political variables.
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Table 1.
 Panel Unit Root Tests
Variable Pesaran 
CIPS
Pesaran 
CIPS*
Smith et 
al. t-test
Smith et 
al. LM-
test
Smith et 
al. max-
test
Smith et 
al. min-
test
GINI -5.36*** -5.59*** -5.82*** 23.15*** -6.14*** 6.25***
Financial Vulnerability -1.27 -1.35 -1.31 3.14 -1.40 1.29
ΔFinancial Vulnerability -5.42*** -5.64*** -6.35*** 20.42*** -7.09*** 7.16***
Per Capita Income -1.28 -1.36 -1.31 3.03 -1.42 1.39
ΔPer Capita Income -5.62*** -5.83*** -6.19*** 20.84*** -6.57*** 6.91***
Enrollment Ratio -1.30 -1.38 -1.36 2.91 -1.39 1.43
ΔEnrollment Ratio -5.53*** -5.77*** -5.60*** 21.16*** -6.84*** 7.11***
Government Expenses -1.27 -1.36 -1.33 3.01 -1.38 1.45
ΔGovernment Expenses -5.81*** -6.03*** -5.97*** 21.79*** -6.40*** 6.44***
Population -1.38 -1.50 -1.46 2.98 -1.47 1.49
ΔPopulation -5.61*** -5.84*** -5.72*** 20.74*** -5.69*** 5.93***
Polity Index -5.48*** -5.61*** -5.55*** 20.52*** -5.38*** 5.41***
Corruption -1.36 -1.42 -1.40 3.04 -1.39 1.43
ΔCorruption -5.62*** -5.79*** -5.73*** 20.18*** -5.58*** 5.74***
The table shows panel unit root tests. Δ denotes first differences. A constant is included in the Pesaran (2007) tests. Rejection of the 
null hypothesis indicates stationarity in at least one country. CIPS* = truncated CIPS test. Critical values for the Pesaran (2007) test 
are -2.40 at 1%, -2.22 at 5%, and -2.14 at 10%, respectively. Both a constant and a time trend are included in the Smith et al. (2004) 
tests. Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates stationarity in at least one country. For both tests the results are reported at lag = 4. 
The null hypothesis is that of a unit root. ***: p≤0.01.
B. GARCH Estimates for GDP Growth 
Next, the analysis considers the methodology proposed by Adrian et al. (2016) 
who employ a GARCH model to estimate the conditional mean and variance of 
GDP growth:
yt = γ0 + γ1yt-1 + γ2πt-1 + γ3 xt-1 + σtεt (1)
ln(σt) = δ0 + δ1 xt-1 (2)
where xt is the financial conditions index, and yt is the GDP growth rate. GDP 
depends on lagged inflation and GDP growth. The results are reported in Table 
2 and they confirm those from Adrian and Duarte (2016) with estimates for the 
U.S.; they clearly indicate that the GDP distribution is left skewed, i.e., downside 
financial conditions lead to higher volatility and lower GDP growth.
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Parameter Coefficients p-value
γ0 1.714** [0.05]
γ1 0.078** [0.05]
γ2 0.036** [0.05]
γ3 -0.429** [0.03]
δ0 0.254* [0.08]
δ1 0.052** [0.03]
Table 2.
GARCH GDP Conditional Mean and Volatility Estimates
The table shows the GDP conditional mean and volatility estimates. Quarterly data, spanning the period 1990-2015 have been 
used. Figures in brackets denote p-values. Finally, * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.
C. GARCH Estimates for Equity Returns
Next, we use a GARCH(1, 1) model that estimates the mean and the volatility of 
the equity return. GARCH-type models have been primarily used in the literature 
on stock market volatility (Christofi and Pericli, 1999; Shin, 2005; Nikkinen, et al., 
2008; Er and Fidan, 2013; among others). The analysis makes use of the overall 
stock market indexes and are computed as stock returns: ln(Pt)-ln(Pt-1), Pt is the 
overall price index.    
Estimates for the model’s parameters are presented in Table 3. The coefficients 
α and β are both statistically significant. The fact that β is relatively larger than α 
suggests that the conditional variance is primarily affected by the values of past 
conditional variance than by new disturbances. Once we get these estimates, then 
we can estimate the mean of the premium and its corresponding volatility.
Parameter Coefficients p-value
μ 1.226** 0.05
ω 0.364** 0.03
α 0.238*** 0.00
β 0.594*** 0.00
LogL 895.409
Table 3.
GARCH Results for Market Returns
The table shows the GARCH results for market returns. Figures in brackets denote-p-values. Log-L is the log-likelihood function. 
Finally, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
D. GMM Estimates of the Parameters of the Index 
The next step estimates the system of equations (B1) through (B4) in Appendix B 
through the linear is conducted within the General Method of Moments (GMM) 
approach (Arellano and Bond, 1991), which explicitly considers endogeneity 
issues. The results are in Table 4. The estimates are expected to calculate the 
vulnerability index from Equation (A7) in Appendix B. Higher values of the index 
illustrate higher financial vulnerability.
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Parameter Coefficients
γ 0.831
ξ 0.314
μx 0.0056
ρx 0.01
k 0.0461
β 0.98
Table 4.
GMM Estimates of the Parameters
The table shows the GMM estimates of the parameters of Equations (B1) to (B4).
E. GMM Estimates Between Income Inequality and the Financial Vulnerability Index
Table 5 reports the empirical findings in relevance to the effect of the financial 
vulnerability index on income inequality. Column (1) reports the bivariate 
estimates, while column (2) reports the multivariate estimates (allowing all the 
other control variables to enter the regression). The findings document that financial 
vulnerability leads to worse income equality conditions. In economic terms, the 
estimates illustrate that a unit increase of the vulnerability index is associated with 
a seven and eight percentage points in the Gini coefficient, respectively.
The results also illustrate that income per capita leads to more income equality, 
while the same holds for the case of school enrolment. Similarly, higher government 
expenses lead to the same results, suggesting that public expenditure programs 
ensure greater income equality conditions (Roberts, 2003). Moreover, higher 
corruption scores lead to a worse income distribution, while higher measures of 
population worsen income equality, with findings being consistent with those by 
Gupta et al. (2002). An improved quality in the political regime (i.e., movements 
towards democracy) leads to a better income distribution. The diagnostics reject 
the null hypothesis of difference-in-Hansen tests, thus, supporting the validity of 
the instruments considered.
F. Robustness Checks: Alternative Definitions of Income Inequality
For robustness purposes, columns (3) to (6) repeat the baseline estimates by making 
use of alternative measures of income inequality (recommended by Frank, 2014). 
These measures are the Atkinson inequality measure and the Theil index. These 
results provide empirical support to those in columns (1) and (2).
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The table shows GMM estimates of the income inequality and financial vulnerability relationship for the entire sample. AR(1) 
is the first-order test for residual autocorrelation. AR(2) is the test for autocorrelation of order 2. Hansen is the test for the 
overidentification check for the validity of instruments. The difference-in-Hansen test checks the exogeneity of the instruments. 
Figures in parentheses denote p-values with ** and *** denoting statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All 
estimations were performed with time dummies.
Table 5.
GMM Estimates Between Income Inequality and Financial Vulnerability
Inequality Measure: Gini Atkinson Theil
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Constant 0.060*** 0.047** 0.064** 0.060** 0.056** 0.045**
[0.01] [0.05] [0.02] [0.03] [0.04] [0.04]
ΔFinancial Vulnerability 0.068*** 0.079*** 0.076*** 0.087*** 0.060*** 0.068***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
ΔPer Capita Income -0.066*** -0.070*** -0.089***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
ΔPer Capita Income(-1) -0.045*** -0.043*** -0.035***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
ΔEnrollment Ratio -0.064*** -0.073*** -0.070***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Polity Index -0.057*** -0.064*** -0.097***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
ΔCorruption 0.050*** 0.061*** 0.092***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
ΔCorruption(-1) 0.038** 0.045*** 0.058***
[0.03] [0.01] [0.00]
ΔPopulation -0.045*** -0.053*** 0.0492***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
ΔPopulation(-1) -0.031*** -0.040*** 0.024**
[0.01] [0.00] [0.05]
ΔGovernment Expenses -0.106*** -0.114*** -0.095***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
ΔGovernment Expenses(-1) -0.054*** -0.062*** -0.068***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
ΔGovernment Expenses(-2) -0.030** -0.038*** -0.042***
[0.03] [0.01] [0.01]
Diagnostic tests
R2 0.38 0.56 0.46 0.62 0.49 0.60
AR(1) [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
AR(2) [0.39] [0.35] [0.50] [0.41] [0.32] [0.28]
Hansen test [0.41] [0.45] [0.45] [0.51] [0.36] [0.43]
Difference Hansen test [0.51] [0.60] [0.59] [0.58] [0.39] [0.50]
No. of observations 884 884 884 884 884 884
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G. Robustness Checks: The Role of the 2007-2008 Crisis in the Nexus of Income Inequality 
and Financial Vulnerability
The final section explores the role of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. According to 
Gorton and Ordonez (2014), the advent of the financial crisis brought a substantial 
increase in financial vulnerability (Ferguson et al., 2007; Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2009; Gorton and Ordonez, 2014; Aikman et al., 2017); financial crises adversely 
affect economic growth, principally due to the decline in investments within an 
environment of lower credit access. At the same time, the austerity measures taken 
by governments have negative social impacts, especially on income inequality. 
The analysis is repeated prior and after the 2008 event. The new results are 
presented in Table 6 and they note that while financial vulnerability maintains its 
negative effect on income equality conditions in both regimes, the impact turns 
out to be more extended over the second regime (after the crisis event).
Table 6.
GMM Estimates Before and After The 2008 Crisis
Inequality Measure Gini Atkinson Theil
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Prior the 2008 crisis
Constant 0.081*** 0.060** 0.075*** 0.064** 0.067*** 0.054**
[0.00] [0.04] [0.00] [0.02] [0.01] [0.03]
ΔFinancial Vulnerability 0.050** 0.058*** 0.056** 0.066*** 0.044** 0.053**
[0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.05] [0.05]
ΔPer Capita Income -0.061*** -0.065*** -0.080***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
ΔPer Capita Income(-1) -0.043*** -0.040*** -0.032**
[0.01] [0.01] [0.04]
ΔEnrollment Ratio -0.062*** -0.070*** -0.062***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Polity Index -0.051*** -0.060*** -0.084***
[0.01] [0.00] [0.00]
ΔCorruption 0.041** 0.054*** 0.081***
[0.03] [0.01] [0.00]
ΔCorruption(-1) 0.033** 0.040** 0.051***
[0.05] [0.03] [0.01]
ΔPopulation -0.040** -0.049*** 0.045**
[0.02] [0.01] [0.01]
ΔGovernment Expenses -0.089*** -0.102*** -0.087***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
ΔGovernment Expenses(-1) -0.050*** -0.057*** -0.061***
[0.01] [0.00] [0.00]
The table shows GMM estimates between income inequality and financial vulnerability (prior and after the 2008 crisis). AR(1) 
is the first-order test for residual autocorrelation. AR(2) is the test for autocorrelation of order 2. Hansen is the test for the 
overidentification check for the validity of instruments. The difference-in-Hansen test checks the exogeneity of the instruments. 
Figures in parentheses denote p-values with ** and *** denoting statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All 
estimations were performed with time dummies.
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Inequality Measure Gini Atkinson Theil
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Diagnostic tests
R2 0.34 0.51 0.44 0.57 0.46 0.57
AR(1) [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
AR(2) [0.35] [0.30] [0.45] [0.40] [0.29] [0.26]
Hansen test [0.40] [0.39] [0.41] [0.48] [0.32] [0.35]
Difference Hansen test [0.49] [0.55] [0.57] [0.61] [0.31] [0.47]
No. of observations 678 678 678 678 678 678
After the 2008 crisis
Constant 0.069*** 0.051** 0.065*** 0.058** 0.061**` 0.047**
[0.01] [0.05] [0.01] [0.03] [0.02] [0.05]
ΔFinancial Vulnerability 0.091*** 0.104*** 0.090*** 0.109*** 0.081*** 0.103***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
ΔPer Capita Income -0.072*** -0.077*** -0.094***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
ΔPer Capita Income(-1) -0.053*** -0.051*** -0.042***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
ΔEnrollment Ratio -0.067*** -0.071*** -0.072***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Polity Index -0.061*** -0.062*** -0.112***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
ΔCorruption 0.052*** 0.064*** 0.101***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
ΔCorruption(-1) 0.042*** 0.052*** 0.064***
[0.01] [0.01] [0.00]
ΔPopulation -0.048*** -0.059*** 0.052***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
ΔPopulation(-1) -0.040*** -0.042*** 0.036**
[0.01] [0.00] [0.03]
ΔGovernment Expenses -0.119*** -0.125*** -0.107***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
ΔGovernment Expenses(-1) -0.061*** -0.067*** -0.072***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
ΔGovernment Expenses(-2) -0.035** -0.044*** -0.053***
[0.02] [0.00] [0.00]
Diagnostic tests
R2 0.38 0.52 0.44 0.57 0.51 0.6
AR(1) [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
AR(2) [0.45] [0.42] [0.54] [0.45] [0.36] [0.37]
Hansen test [0.46] [0.50] [0.52] [0.56] [0.39] [0.45]
Difference Hansen test [0.53] [0.59] [0.58] [0.63] [0.44] [0.52]
No. of observations 206 206 206 206 206 206
Table 6.
GMM Estimates Before and After The 2008 Crisis (Continued)
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IV. CONCLUSION
This paper provided a study concerning the impact of financial vulnerability 
on income inequality. With the use of a panel of OECD countries and the 
methodologies of panel GARCH and GMM approaches the results documented 
that financial vulnerability exerted a negative impact on income inequality. The 
results survived alternative income inequality, while they highlighted the impact 
of the Global Financial Crisis by documenting that the role of financial vulnerability 
in the income inequality process was enhanced over the crisis regime. 
Financial vulnerability adds a new risk-taking channel. This new venue of the 
transmission mechanism can significantly affect income inequality issues, and this 
raises the importance of the role of regulators and policy makers to efficiently 
monitor financial intermediation, as well as financial markets. 
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Appendix A
List of Countries.
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, U.K., U.S.
Appendix B.
dyt = σ-1 (it – πt) dt + d(erpt) (B1)
d(erpt) = -ρ Vt dt + ξ (Vt – xt) dZt (B2)
dxt = ρx (μx – xt) dt + σxdZx,t (B3)
dπt = (β πt – k yt) dt (B4)
y is GDP, π stands for inflation, i is the central bank interest rate, erp is the 
equity risk premium. The vulnerability determines the conditional mean –ρVt and 
the conditional volatility ξ (Vt – xt) of the risk premium. Shocks dZt and dZx,t 
are not correlated to each other, xt is the shock to volatility (following a mean 
reverting process). ρ is the mean reversion for the equity premium. Equation 
(B1) is the IS curve, plus a risk premium, Equation (B2) illustrates that the risk 
premium depends on vulnerability Vt. Equation (B3) describes the path of shocks 
in the economy. Finally, Equation (B4) is the Phillips curve. They also minimize a 
quadratic loss function: 
(B5)
subject to the restrictions describes in equations (B1)-(B4). They also provide 
the quadratic solution which yields:
L (y; π; x) = c0 + c1y + c2y2 + c3x + c4x2 + c5yx + c6π + c7π2 + c8yπ + c9πx (B6)
And, thus, they provide the vulnerability index:
FVt = [(1-γξ)/ξ
2] yt + [(1-γξ) c8]/ [2ξ
2 c2] πt + [1-(γξ-1)/2ξ2] [c5/c2] xt +
[(1-γξ)/2ξ2][c1/c2] (B7)
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where:
c1 = [2ξ2μxρx/(1-γξ)2] [c2 c9/c8]
c2 = {[4c6ξ2k2/(1-γξ)2] + [2(1-γξ)2/ξ2]}-1
c5 = [-2c2/k + 1/ρx(1/k – 1/k(β + (1-γξ)2/ξ2) c2)] x 
 
       [(-(1-γξ)2/2ξ2ρx) (1/kc2 – 1/k(β + (1-γξ)
2/ξ2)) + 1/k (β + ρx + (1-γξ)
2/ξ2)-1
c6 = -1/k c1 [β + (1-γξ)2/ξ2] + μxρx c5/k
c8 = 1/k – 1/k(β + (1-γξ)2/ξ2)c2
c9 = -2/k c2 -1/k(β + ρx + (1-γξ)2/ξ2) c5
